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1 Introduction
Motivation
In recession, discretionary scal policy has traditionally focused on stabi-
lizing economic activity. In contrast, following the nancial crisis, the ensuing
recession and the build up of government debt, scal policy in many countries
has been more concerned than before with controlling that debt and its cost.
As a result, a countrys credit rating has become a key indicator of the credibil-
ity of its scal stance. O¢ cial credit ratings are provided by the credit rating
agencies (CRAs). Concerns have, however, been expressed about their lack of
transparency and timeliness by, for example, the European Commission. In this
paper we present a measure of sovereign credit ratings that can be calculated
easily and quickly that may be of use to government and the private sector as a
benchmark. This measure is based solely on the ability of a country to use tax
policy to repay its outstanding nancial liabilities and consequently focuses on
its scal stance. It therefore di¤ers somewhat from o¢ cial credit ratings which
take into account additional factors that might determine the ability of a govern-
ment to service and repay its debt together with the willingness of governments
to do so which is di¢ cult to quantify.
In November 2011 the European Commission issued a proposal for stricter
rules on CRAs to make them more transparent and accountable, and to increase
competition in the credit rating sector. The Commissions proposal stressed the
role of conict of interests, political interference and ine¢ ciencies in existing
CRAs methodologies. It also suggested the creation of an European-based CRA
to counter the inuence of U.S.-based CRAs (European Commission, 2011).1
New regulations on CRAs were subsequently approved on January 2013 by
the European Parliament. These allow agencies to issue unsolicited sovereign
debt ratings only on set dates; make CRAs more accountable for their actions;
and ensure that information on the underlying facts and assumptions on each
rating is made publicly available in order to facilitate a better understanding of
credit ratings (European Commission, 2013). Both the 2011 proposal and the
2013 regulations stressed the importance to nancial investors of determining
their own independent evaluation of credit ratings.2 Subsequently, however, the
Commission abandoned the plan of establishing a new (European-based) CRA
as it was thought too costly.
Methodology
The measure of a sovereign credit presented in this paper is model based.
This makes it easy to replicate and to amend, transparent, independent, simple
to derive and hence may be made in a timely manner. Transparency refers to
the ease of the general public to access and to reproduce credit ratings and
1The role of asymetric information and conict of interests in the credit-rating industry
has been extensively analysed in the economic literature. Recent examples include Mathis,
Mc Andrews and Rochet (2009) and Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (2012).
2White (2010)s review of the regulatory structure of CRAs concludes with a similar pro-
posal of investors seeking their own independent assessment of the credit rating as a way for
reducing reliance on CRAs.
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to the ability of the public to make its own judgments about their validity.
The model itself can be amended to suit individual preferences whilst retaining
the transparency of the credit rating. Independence reects the derivation of
sovereign credit ratings due to being model-based rather than driven by the
subjective evaluation of analysts. The rating can be updated systematically
using the latest available data and, for this reason, is timely; it is inexpensive
to produce, and can even be automated.
The measure is an adaption to sovereign debt of the logic of Black and
Scholess (1974) formula for pricing the probability of exercising an American
option. It entails estimating the probability that the debt-GDP ratio will ex-
ceed a given limit or threshold at any time over a given time horizon and then
mapping this default probability into a credit rating. Uncertainty about the
credit rating can be taken into account using estimates of the distributions of
the forecast error of the debt-GDP ratio and of the debt limit. We implement
the procedure in a particular way using specic forecasts of the future debt-GDP
ratio and a specic model for the debt limits. The methodology, however, pro-
vides a general framework for constructing sovereign credit ratings that can be
implemented using any forecast or o¢ cial budget projections of the distribution
of the debt-GDP ratio and any measure of the debt limit.
In this paper we obtain forecasts of the debt-GDP ratio using a rolling-
window VAR (a ROVAR model), that is based on an open-economy reduced-
form specication. The parameters vary due to structural or policy changes and
the model is subject to shocks that have time-varying volatility. In this way we
are able to track changes over time in both the point forecasts of debt-GDP ratio
and their uncertainty; both a¤ect the subsequent credit rating. This choice of
forecasting method reects the well-known nding that VARs forecast at least
as well as structural models, including dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) models. A ROVAR is also easily estimated and updated.
The debt limit measures the maximum borrowing capacity of an economy.
It is derived from an open-economy DSGE model with distortionary taxation
in which the probability of default on sovereign bonds is treated as exogenous.
The debt limit is based exclusively on the ability of a government to alter scal
policy in the future to meet its outstanding nancial obligations. This depends
on whether scal policy changes are anticipated or unanticipated by market
participants and, if unanticipated, whether they could arise from changes in
expenditure policy, tax policy or both. The model is solved using a nonlinear
algorithm calibrated with time-varying and country-specic data. This delivers
time series of the debt limit that show how the maximum borrowing capacity of
an economy evolves over time as a result of the changing ability of a government
to use its scal instruments to repay its nancial obligations and of changes in
the state of the economy.
Basing the debt limit solely on scal considerations provides a narrower as-
sessment of sovereign creditworthiness than that of the CRAs as it excludes
factors that might contribute to the ability of a government to repay debt, such
as the willingness and the political ability of delivering the required changes
in scal policy, or the possibility of using either domestic or external non-scal
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sources of debt repayment, for example, changes in monetary policy and external
bailouts. The merit of this narrower but simpler denition is that it conveys a
clear and unambiguous interpretation of the credit rating, a feature particularly
relevant for investors seeking transparent and independent assessment of the
credit ratings. Any discrepancies between the model-based and the o¢ cial rat-
ings could therefore be due to the CRAs taking into account factors beyond the
mere nancial ability of generating saving to repay debt. The methodology out-
lined in the paper can be extended to include some, if not all, of these non-scal
factors but would be at the expense of further complicating the cross-country
analysis and the interpretation of the determinants of the credit rating.
The paper builds on Polito and Wickens (2014) which provides model-based
credit ratings for the United States. The focus in this paper is on provid-
ing model-based credit ratings for the major countries of the European Union,
many of which have experienced an unprecedented deterioration in their public
nances over the past 10 years. This has prompted a debate about the current
and future arrangements for scal policy in Europe to which we believe this
paper makes an important contribution. Whereas the US may be considered
a closed economy for these purposes, the EU countries are better regarded as
open economies. This is reected in the use of an open-economy model to de-
termine debt limits and to forecast future debt-GDP ratios. The analysis of
the results incorporates three new features. First, we calculate debt limits and
credit ratings based on unchanged and tax-maximizing policies. This enables us
to obtain estimates of the capacity of a country to increase its debt and of the
e¤ects on its credit rating. Second, we compare a countrys credit rating with its
CDS price and the timing of changes in the two. Third, as we are dealing with
a group of countries, rather than a single country, we can study the evolution
over time of the cross-section distribution of credit ratings.
The emphasis in this paper is very di¤erent from the literature on sovereign
credit ratings. Here the aim is to construct credit ratings from economic (es-
pecially scal) fundamentals. The substantial academic literature is concerned
almost entirely with discovering which nancial and macroeconomic variables
are signicant in explaining o¢ cial sovereign credit ratings.3 It appears that
there is little or no literature on how one might construct sovereign credit rat-
ings based on macroeconomic fundamentals. The literature cannot therefore
provide an assessment of sovereign credit ratings that is independent of the
credit ratings of the CRAs.
Empirical ndings
We calculate the measure of sovereign credit ratings for fourteen European
(EU14): Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ire-
land, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the U.K. These are
compared with the historic credit rating issued by CRAs and with market-
determined sovereign credit default swap (CDS) prices.
The historic credit ratings for the EU14 countries over the past 20 years
3Recent examples of this include Hill, Brooks and Fa¤ (2010), Afonso, Gomes and Rhother
(2011) and Afonso, Furceri and Gomes (2012).
4
have been somewhat higher than those of other countries. Their cross-section
distribution has been stable within the investment grade at least until 2010. At
this point the distribution became more dispersed signalling the start of the EU
sovereign debt crisis. There is, however, no clear relation between changes in the
ratings issued by CRAs during the nancial crisis and the markets perception
of the probability of sovereign default as measured by changes in CDS prices.
Despite uctuations in their CDS prices, a number of EU countries have con-
tinued to receive the highest credit rating. Although some EU countries were
downgraded after a signicant increase in their CDS prices, other countries have
been downgraded even though their CDS prices were falling.
The main ndings are that the model-based credit ratings: (i) anticipate the
downgrades of Ireland, Spain, Portugal and the U.K. that occurred from the
end of the 2010s; (ii) downgrade Greece to the lowest rating (coinciding with
its highest default probability) from at least mid 2000; (iii) suggest that the
Italian sovereign credit rating has been overstated. For all other countries, the
model-based credit ratings are similar, but not identical, to the credit ratings
provided by the CRAs as the model-based credit ratings indicate temporary
downgrades of 1 or 2 notches for short periods of time (1 or 2 quarters) whenever
there is a temporary deterioration in the scal stance. An implication of these
results is that the cross-section distribution of the model-based sovereign credit
rating is no longer concentrated within the investment grade prior 2010 and
it starts changing signicantly from 2008. This suggests that a model-based
credit rating would have identied and signalled to market participants signs of
the impending European sovereign debt crisis well before 2010, when the CRAs
rst reacted to the crisis. We have emphasised that model-based credit ratings
are constructed on a di¤erent basis from the o¢ cial ratings. This could explain
the di¤erences between the o¢ cial and model-based ratings, especially in the
early stages of the crisis; it may be because the o¢ cial ratings take account of
additional factors and not because their response is delayed.4 We also nd that
for several countries the model-based credit ratings anticipate the changes in
CDS prices that occurred during the nancial crisis.
By comparing a countrys debt limit under unchanged policy and after max-
imizing tax revenues (its maximum borrowing capacity) and observing how this
changes over time, we can assess the capability of a country to increase its debt
by changing scal policy. The numerical analysis suggests that for most EU14
countries the scope for increasing borrowing capacity by increasing taxation is
limited as for many countries tax revenues based on unchanged policy are sim-
ilar to tax revenues maximized with respect to tax rates. It therefore appears
that these EU14 countries are more likely to be able to raise debt limits and
achieve scal consolidation by reducing their expenditures than by increasing
4Under this alternative interpretation, the most likely factors to explain the di¤erence
between the model-based and the historic ratings are (i) the ability of using domestic monetary
policy (ination) to complement scal revenues for countries that are not in the Euro and (ii)
the condence in the possibility of the European Central Bank (ECB) becoming a lender of
last resort (or equivalently condence in the willingness of maintaining the common currency)
for countries in the Euro.
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taxes.
Organization of the paper
In Section 2 we provide some information about the sovereign credit ratings
issued by the CRAs and establish a number of stylized facts about the historic
credit ratings of EU14 countries. In Section 3 we describe the theory underlying
the model-based sovereign credit ratings. The DSGE macroeconomic model
used to derive debt limits is developed in Section 4, where we also derive the
numerical solutions for the EU14 countries for the period 1995:4 to 2012:4.
In Section 5 we report the model-based sovereign credit ratings for the EU14
countries and re-evaluate the stylized facts outlined in Section 2. We reect on
the ndings and discuss potential extensions of this approach in Section 6. The
data used in the paper are described in Appendix A; the theoretical derivation
of the debt limits is summarized in Appendix B; and the algorithm used to
numerically evaluate country debt limits is described in Appendix C. Further
results on the model-based ratings are in Appendix D.
2 Historic rating of EU14 countries
Sovereign credit ratings are opinions issued by CRAs on the creditworthiness of
a particular sovereign issuer or nancial instrument. They assess the likelihood
that a sovereign government will default either on its nancial obligations gener-
ally (issuer rating), or on a particular debt or xed income security (instrument
rating).
The notion of a sovereign credit rating has evolved over time. Originally
it was based on the perceived ability and willingness of a government to meet
its nancial obligations. More recently the three main CRAs (Fitch Ratings,
Moodys Investors Service and Standard & Poors) view a sovereign credit rating
as being closely related to a governments ability to repay debt. This denition
seems particularly appropriate for countries - like the EU14 countries - that
are generally regarded as being committed to the repayment of their sovereign
obligations.
The methodologies used by CRAs to determine sovereign ratings are ulti-
mately based on the judgment of their teams of analysts. No CRA simply uses
a mathematical formula or an economic model to measure sovereign credit rat-
ings. Instead, sovereign risk units are in charge of issuing new credit ratings and
of monitoring and reviewing existing ratings. The qualitative and quantitative
criteria and variables employed to determine a credit rating vary across CRAs
and have changed over time. Typically no information is provided on how each
criterion and variable is weighted in the nal determination of the overall credit
rating.
CRAs issue their ratings in the form of letter grades. These refer to long- and
short-term ratings depending on whether the evaluation is based on an horizon
of more or less than 12-months. As shown in Table 1, di¤erences in the rating
scale adopted by the three main CRAs are minimal (the last column provides a
broad interpretation). For reference, in the rest of this paper we adopt a rating
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Table 1: Rating scales adopted by the three main CRAs.
Moodys Fitch S&P Credit quality
Investment Aaa AAA AAA Prime
grade (I.G.) Aa1 AA+ AA+ High
Aa2 AA AA grade
Aa3 AA- AA-
A1 A+ A+
A2 A A
A3 A- A- Medium
Baa1 BBB+ BBB+ grade
Baa2 BBB BBB
Baa3 BBB- BBB-
Speculative Ba1 BB+ BB+
grade (S.G.) Ba2 BB BB Speculative
Ba3 BB- BB-
B1 B+ B+ Highly
B2 B B speculative
B3 B- B-
Caa CCC Little prospect
Ca CC CCC for recovery
C C
DDD, DD, D D In default
Source: Authorsclassication based on Gaillard (2012)
scale similar to that currently used by Moodys (second column, Table 1). This
comprises 19 grades, ranging from triple-A (Aaa), indicating the best rating
quality and minimum risk, to C, which denotes obligations that are typically
in default. The top ten grades, between triple-A and Baa3, are referred to as
investment grade, indicating low risk obligations; the remaining 9 ratings are
assigned to higher risk obligations, and thus termed as speculative grades.5
Moodys (2012) credit ratings for the EU14 countries reveal the following ve
highlights which we refer to as the stylized facts.6 The rst stylized fact (SF1)
is that the sovereign credit ratings of the EU14 countries taken as a group has
been higher than those of other countries. The second stylized fact (SF2) is that
the cross-section distribution of the EU14 countries sovereign credit ratings has
been stable within the investment grade at least until 2010. The third stylized
fact (SF3) is that sharp changes in this distribution have occurred, particularly
since 2010. The fourth stylized fact (SF4) is that uctuations in EU14 sovereign
5Gaillard (2012) provides an updated survey on the methodologies and the denitions and
types of sovereign ratings currently followed by the main CRAs.
6There is a strong positive correlation between the sovereign ratings issued by the three
main CRAs (Gaillard, 2012). Consequently, the stylized facts highlighted in this section hold
regardless of the source of the sovereign ratings, whether these are taken from either Fitch
Ratings, Moodys Investors Service or Standard & Poors.
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Table 2: Distribution of historic sovereign credit ratings of EU14 countries at
selected dates.
1990 1995 2000 2005 2006-2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Aaa 50% 36% 57% 71% 71% 64% 57% 57% 50%
Aa 36% 43% 36% 21% 21% 29% 21% 7% 14%
A 7% 14% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 14% 7%
Baa 7% 7% 0% 0% 0% 0% 7% 0 7%
Ba 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 7% 14% 14%
B 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0 0%
Caa-C 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 7% 7%
Share of investment grade
EU14 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 93% 79% 79%
ARC 86% 78% 59% 63% n.a. n.a. 61% n.a. 60%
Notes: ARC=All Rated Countries in a specic year; n.a.=not available.
Source: Moodys (2012)
credit ratings have increased as the ratings have fallen. The fth stylized fact
(SF5) is that for eight of the EU14 countries their credit rating seems una¤ected
by changes in their CDS prices, the markets perception of the probability of
sovereign default. The notable exceptions are Greece, Ireland, Portugal and
Spain.
Table 2 provides evidence on SF1, SF2 and SF3: it reports the cross-section
distribution of the sovereign credit rating of EU14 countries at selected dates
between 1995 and 2012. All EU14 countries are rated as investment grade from
1990 to 2005. The share of investment-grade sovereign issuers in the EU14 group
has declined since 2005. By 2012 it is still about 20 percentage points higher
relative to a larger sample comprising all countries that are rated by Moodys.
The share of EU14 countries in the Aaa category declined in the early 1990s
and then climbed back by the early 2000s. It further declined during the latest
global nancial crisis, reaching the levels of the early 1990s. Until 2008 all
EU14 countries were rated within the band triple A to single A; moreover, their
shares in the three years before the crisis were stable. In 2009 the proportion
of sovereigns rated Aa increased as a result of the downgrade of a number of
triple-A countries. The downgrades in 2010 and 2011 led to a further decline in
the proportion of countries rated Aaa and Aa, and an increase of the share of
countries rated single-A or below. The share of speculative-grade ratings rose
from 2010 to 2011 and remained stable in 2012. The distribution reached the
Caa-C lower bound as a result of the Greek debt exchange proposal in February
2012, which resulted in losses for investors in excess of 70 per cent of the face
value.
A time series from 1990:1 to 2012:4 of the historic credit ratings for each
of the EU14 countries in Figure 1 provides evidence on SF4, the level and
the volatility of the sovereign credit ratings. Four groups of countries may be
identied: countries that have been rated triple-A for the whole sample period
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Figure 1: Historic sovereign credit rating of EU14 countries, 1990-2012.
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(Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, top-left panel);
countries that have been rated within the top-three notches over the whole
sample period (Denmark, Finland and France, top-right panel); countries that
have always been rated within the Aaa-A range (Belgium, Italy and Sweden,
bottom-left panel); and countries that have been outside the Aaa-A rating range
(Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, bottom-right panel). The countries in the
top two panels have more stable credit ratings than those in the bottom two
panels. The standard deviations of the series in each panel are, starting from
the top left panel and moving clockwise, 0, 0.47, 0.93 and 2.74 respectively.
As highlighted earlier, numerous revisions in the credit ratings occurred in the
1990s and from 2010.
The relation between historic credit ratings and the market perception of
sovereign risk in the EU14 countries (SF5) is shown in Figure 2 which reports
for the EU14 countries the daily price of CDSs for 5-year sovereign bonds (mea-
sured in basis points, bps) together with their sovereign credit ratings from
December 2007 to March 2013.7 Prior to 2007 there was no CDS market for
European sovereign securities. This reects the fact that until then govern-
ment bonds in these countries were regarded as risk-free securities. For Austria,
Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK CDS prices
declined after 2009 but returned to 2009 values by 2012, only to fall again after-
wards. Nonetheless, the credit rating for all of these countries remained triple-A
throughout. We note however that the CDS prices for these countries varied
7CDS prices are taken from Thomson Reuters, accessed from Datastream in March 2013.
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Figure 2: Sovereign credit ratings and 5-year credit default swap prices for EU14
countries, 14/12/2007 - 22/03/2013.
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only within a moderate range compared with the other EU countries. While
the CDS prices for France and the U.K. have uctuated within a similar range,
both countries have been downgraded: France in November 2012, and the U.K.
in February 2013, when CDS prices on UK bonds were almost at their lowest
level since 2009. The CDS prices for Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain
were on an upward trend until the end of 2011 and fell afterwards. The rst two
countries were downgraded as their CDS prices fell. Ireland received a signi-
cant downgrade as its sovereign CDS prices were increasing over the 2009-2011
period, but its credit rating was not reversed when the CDS price fell from the
second half of 2011 until 2013. CDS prices on Greek bonds were traded at 50
bps between December 2007 and September 2008 then, from August 2009, they
then began to increase at an almost exponential pace to reach the 400 bps mark
by April 2010, the date of the rst downgrade on Greek bonds.
3 Methodology
The methodology consists of mapping the probability of sovereign default into
a credit rating. The probability of default is measured by adapting for appli-
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cation to the government budget constraint (GBC) Black and Scholess (1973)
default formula for pricing American call options. Black and Scholes showed
that the current value of the call depends on the risk-adjusted probability that
the option will be exercised. This is determined from the projection of the
current value of the asset over the maturity period, the exercise price and the
assets price volatility. Mertons (1974) formalization of this idea, when applied
to government debt, entails estimating the probability that the debt-GDP ratio
will exceed a given limit, or default threshold, at any time over a specic time
horizon. As we also take account of the probability of not defaulting by the end
of the time horizon, we are e¤ectively measuring the probability that an Ameri-
can option is exercised at any time up to and including the expiry date. Default
probabilities are converted into credit ratings using CRAsrecords of historic
long-term default experience. The implementation of the model on empirical
data requires forecasts of the debt-GDP ratio and standard error of the forecast
at given time horizons. The next three sub-sections describe in detail the key
steps of the methodology.
3.1 Default probability
The starting point for the determination of the probability that the debt-GDP
ratio will exceed a given threshold at some point over a given time horizon is
the one-period GBC. The nominal GBC for an open economy whose nominal
government debt is held domestically and externally can be written as
Dt + [(1  t) it(BDt 1 +BFt 1) + (1  t)(BDt 1 +BFt 1) = BDt +BFt
where Dt is the nominal primary decit, BDt is domestically held government
debt, BFt is externally held government debt, and it is the e¤ective nominal
interest rate on government bonds. The variables t 2 (0; 1) and t 2 (0; 1)
denote the shares of government bond interest payments and principal lost by
bondholders due to default.
The GBC can be expressed in terms of the proportion of nominal GDP as
bt
yt
=
dt
yt
+ (1 + t)
bt 1
yt 1
(1)
dt
yt
=
gt
yt
+
zt
yt
  vt
yt
(2)
(1 + t) =
1 + (1  t) it   t
(1 + t) (1 + t)
(3)
where yt is real GDP, dt is the real primary decit, gt is real government expen-
ditures, zt is real transfers, vt is real tax revenues including seigniorage revenues,
bt = b
D
t + b
F
t , b
D
t is real domestically held government debt and b
F
t is real ex-
ternally held government debt. dtyt is the primary decit-GDP ratio,
bt
yt
is the
debt-GDP ratio, t is the ination rate, t is the rate of growth of GDP. t may
be interpreted as the e¤ective discount rate after default adjusted for ination
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(rt) less growth and is approximately equal to
t ' (1  t) it   t   t   t = rt   t:
The debt-GDP ratio in period t+ h is therefore
bt+h
yt+h
=  
hX
j=1

js=1
 
1 + t+s
 dt+j
yt+j

+hs=1
 
1 + t+s
 bt
yt
;
where the right-hand side is the cumulative saving generated by current and
future primary surpluses from t to t+h plus the interest cost of rolling-over the
current debt-GDP ratio until period t+ h.
Default is assumed to occur between periods t and t+h if the expected value
of the debt-GDP ratio conditional on information available in period t exceeds
the threshold (debt limit) bt+hyt+h . pt;t+h, the probability of sovereign default by
period t+h, is the probability of not defaulting prior to year t+h but defaulting
in year t+ h, and hence is given by
pt;t+h = pt+h (1  pt+h 1) (1  pt+h 2) ::: (1  pt+1) :
pt+h denotes the probability of defaulting in period t+ h given the information
available in period t, and is measured by
pt+h = Pr

bt+h
yt+h
 bt+h
yt+h
jt

;
where Pr (:) is assumed to be the normal probability density function and t
denotes information available at time t.
The default threshold bt+hyt+h represents the amount of debt that a country will
be either willing or able to repay at a specic time in the future. In practice,
market analysts and investors may have in mind a debt-GDP threshold of their
own, which may depend upon considerations both about a governments ability
to meet its nancial obligations using scal policy and its willingness to service
its debt. We will return on how to measure and interpret the debt limit in
Section 4.
The debt-GDP ratio at time t+ 1 may be decomposed into
bt+1
yt+1
= Et
bt+1
yt+1
+ t+1
where Et
bt+1
yt+1
is the expectation of the debt-GDP ratio by the end of period
t + 1 conditional on information available in t and t+1 is the corresponding
innovation in period t+ 1. The latter may be written as
t = t"t;
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where "t  i:i:d: (0; 1). It then follows that the debt-GDP ratio for period t+ h
may be written as
bt+h
yt+h
= Et
bt+h
yt+h
+ t+h
t+h = 
h
s=1t+s
where Vt(t+h) = 
2
;t+h = 
h
s=1
2
t+s is the conditional variance of the debt-
GDP ratio.
Dening
DDt+h =
Et
bt+h
yt+h
  bt+hyt+h
;t+h
(4)
as the distance-to-default of sovereign debt, the probability of sovereign default
in period t+ h given information in period t is
pt+h = Pr
  DDt+h  t+hjt ; (5)
where
t+h =
t+h
;t+h
:
The probability of default therefore increases as the gap between the expected
and the threshold debt-GDP ratio (Et
bt+h
yt+h
  bt+hyt+h ) widens and the uncertainty
surrounding the forecasts of the debt-GDP ratio (t+h) increases. This prob-
ability changes over time as changes in the base year and in information alter
the forecast of the debt-GDP ratio, its uncertainty and the debt threshold.
The probability of default in any period between t and t+h (the cumulative
default probability) is
pct;t+h =
hX
j=1
pt;t+j ; (6)
which is calculated assuming a standard cumulative normal distribution.
Equation (4) measures the distance-to-default for given values of the debt-
GDP limit, the point forecast and the standard deviation of the debt-GDP ratio
at a specic time horizon. Uncertainty about these three components can be
accounted for by constructing distributions of the debt-limit, the debt-GDP
forecast and its conditional variance at each time horizon. The distribution of
the distance-to-default can then be constructed. This can then be translated
into a distribution of the probability of default using equations (5) and (6).
3.2 Mapping into credit rating
Next we require a mapping of the probability of sovereign default into a credit
rating scale that includes the 19 letter-type categories (from Aaa to C) reported
in the second column of Table 1. This mapping is required to make the model-
based ratings directly comparable with the o¢ cial ratings. Any rating scale can
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Table 3: Sovereign credit ratings and average cumulative default rates (in per-
centage), 1983-2012.
Year Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa-C
1 0 0 0 0 0.644 2.724 27.979
2 0 0 0.090 0.360 1.715 5.279 35.233
3 0 0 0.463 0.744 3.050 6.875 40.933
4 0 0 0.861 1.153 4.542 8.984 40.933
5 0 0 1.291 1.586 6.144 11.158 40.933
6 0 0 1.761 2.006 7.293 13.218 40.933
7 0 0 2.284 2.006 8.911 15.108 40.933
8 0 0 2.871 2.006 11.004 16.608 40.933
9 0 0 3.533 2.006 12.743 17.502 40.933
10 0 0 4.287 2.006 14.374 18.541 40.933
Source: Moodys (2012)
however be used. The starting point for constructing this mapping is Moodys
(2012) record of cumulative default rates and sovereign credit rating reported
in Table 3. This shows the default history of sovereign securities within specic
rating categories over a 10-year horizon. Since sovereign credit ratings issued by
CRAs do not entirely reect default probabilities, it is not possible to discrim-
inate between the Aaa and Aa ratings based solely on the history of default.
Moreover, a default prole is available only for 7 out of the 19 categories in the
second column of Table 1.8
We therefore use a two-stage linear interpolation to estimate this missing
information. For each year in Table 3 we derive the probability of default
associated with each of the 19 categories in Table 1 by interpolating the missing
observations.9 This initial interpolation has the e¤ect of assigning, for each
year, nonzero default probabilities for ratings Aaa-Baa3 in year 1, and ratings
Aaa-Aa3 in subsequent years. We then interpolate further to derive from these
annual data a quarterly mapping for the whole 10-year period.10
The nal four columns of Table 4 report the cumulative probability of default
by the end of the rst, fth and tenth year, as well as the unweighted average
over the whole 10-year period. The 1-year scale is used later to derive the
measure of the short-term rating, while the 5-year, 10-year and average scales
are used to measure long-term ratings over alternative time horizons.
8For the zero entries in Table 1 for credit ratings less than Aaa the actual probability is
non-negative but is zero to three signicant gures.
9We assume that ratings Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B and Caa-C in Table 3 correspond respectively
to Aa3, A3, Baa3, Ba3, B3 and C in Table 1 (second column). We also replace the values of
0 for A and Baa in year 1 of Table 3 with 0.09/2 and 0.36/2 respectively, i.e. half of the value
in the following year.
10This second round of interpolation is carried out assuming that in the rst year the
default probability at the beginning of the rst quarter is 0. We have also replaced the default
probabilities at the end of the rst year for Aaa ratings from 0.000*e-20 to 0.000499, as the
model typically yields a nonzero default probability for Aaa ratings.
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Table 4: Mapping from cumulative default probabilities to sovereign credit rat-
ings.
Rating Cumulative default probability
Category Long-term Short-term 1-year 5-year 10-year average
Investment Aaa Prime - 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
grade Aa1 Prime - 1 0.008 0.215 0.715 0.265
Aa2 Prime - 1 0.015 0.430 1.429 0.529
Aa3 Prime - 1 0.023 0.646 2.144 0.794
A1 Prime - 1 0.030 0.861 2.858 1.058
A2 Prime - 1/2 0.038 1.076 3.573 1.323
A3 Prime - 1/2 0.045 1.291 4.287 1.588
Baa1 Prime - 2 0.090 1.389 3.527 1.501
Baa2 Prime- 2 or 3 0.135 1.488 2.766 1.415
Baa3 Prime-3 0.180 1.586 2.006 1.329
Speculative Ba1 Not Prime 0.335 3.105 6.129 3.052
grade Ba2 Not Prime 0.489 4.625 10.251 4.776
Ba3 Not Prime 0.644 6.144 14.374 6.499
B1 Not Prime 1.337 7.815 15.763 7.962
B2 Not Prime 2.031 9.487 17.152 9.425
B3 Not Prime 2.724 11.158 18.541 10.887
Caa Not Prime 11.142 21.083 26.005 19.711
Ca Not Prime 19.561 31.008 33.469 28.534
C Not Prime 27.979 40.933 40.933 37.358
Source: Rating (www.moodys.com); Default probability (authorscalculations)
3.3 Debt-GDP forecasts and volatility
We obtain forecasts of the debt-GDP ratio using a rolling-window VAR (a
ROVARmodel). As previously noted, this is based on an open-economy reduced-
form model. It allows for the possibility that its parameters have altered due
to structural or policy changes and for changes to the volatility of shocks to the
economy. In this way we are able to track changes over time in the distribution
of the forecasts: the point forecasts of debt-GDP ratio and their uncertainty.
Changes in this distribution may a¤ect the subsequent credit rating; for exam-
ple, greater forecast uncertainty would increase the probability of exceeding the
debt limit and hence may reduce the credit rating. In this way the forecasts
accommodate the changes in parameters and volatility that characterize the
period of the great moderation (the 1990s and the 2000s), the sudden swings
observed during both the great acceleration (between the late 1970s and the
early 1980s) and the e¤ects of the latest global nancial crisis (from 2008 to
2012).
This choice of forecasting method reects the well-known nding that VARs
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forecast at least as well as structural models. Support for this approach is
provided by Kapetanios et al. (2012) who nd that forecasts from a rolling
window VAR are not outperformed by forecasts obtained from other reduced-
form models, such as the VAR with time-varying parameters and stochastic
volatility of Primiceri (2005) and the Markov-switching VAR of Sims and Zha
(2006). Recent examples of rolling-window analyses in macroeconomics include
Stock and Watson (2008), Orphanides and Wei (2012) and Canova and Ferroni
(2012). A ROVAR is also easily estimated and updated.
Despite these advantages, using a ROVAR to obtain the forecasts of the debt-
GDP ratio is not an essential part of the methodology. The forecasts could be
derived in other ways. For example, they could be obtained from a structural
model such as a DSGE model. It can, however, be shown from its solution that
using a DSGE model would be equivalent to using a VAR with restrictions. If
the implied restrictions are correct, then the structural model should provide a
similar forecasting performance to its associated reduced form; otherwise, the
forecasts would be expected to be worse because, unlike a VAR, there is no
automatic bias correction for misspecication when seeking a model with best
t. The evidence supports this assessment as forecasts from DSGE models have
been found not to signicantly outperform those from a VAR, particularly in
the short and medium term, see Wickens (2014).
The ROVAR model that includes the following variables: the debt-GDP
ratio ( btyt ), the total decit-GDP ratio (
TDt
yt
),11 the growth rate real GDP (t),
the ination rate (t), a short-term nominal interest rate (rst ), a long-term
nominal interest rate (rlt), the real exchange rate (et), the ratio of the current
account to GDP (xtyt ) and the oil-price ination rate (
o
t ). Quarterly observations
for each variable are available from 1977:2 to 2012:4 for Portugal, and from
1975:2 to 2012:4 for all other countries. The data for Germany prior 1991
refer to West Germany alone. Appendix A.1 provides details. The rst four
variables capture the behavior of the scal and the domestic private sectors.
They also allow the model to implicitly satisfy the GBC. The short- and long-
term interest rates capture the links between the debt-GDP ratio, monetary
policy and the term structure. The last three variables reect the impact of the
external sector (the exchange rate and the current account balance) and global
economic factors (the oil-price ination rate) on the domestic macroeconomic
and scal outlooks. Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2008, pp.6) document that "peaks and
troughs in commodity price cycles appear to be leading indicators of peaks and
troughs in the capital ow cycle, with troughs typically resulting in multiple
defaults". The variables included in the ROVAR give a description of open
economies typical of the empirical literature on scal shocks and business cycle
uctuations that is based on reduced-form models; see for example Fatas and
Mihov (2001), Canzonieri et al. (2002), Chung and Leeper (2007).12
11From equation (1), the total decit is TDt
yt
= dt
yt
+ t
bt 1
yt 1
.
12Our analysis makes no explicit allowance for private credit and the absorbtion of a large
part of these in the scal data of Ireland and Spain. However, private credit is included
implicitly in the VAR. First, the VAR captures bank bailouts as soon as these are recorded
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The ROVAR is specied with a constant and one lag in each equation; it
is estimated with OLS using a rolling-window sample of 30 quarters for all
countries. We generate forecasts of the distribution of the debt-GDP ratio
over an horizon of 40 quarters from 1995:4 to 2012:4. The forecast variance is
measured from the covariance matrix of the h-period ahead forecast error. As
they are also one-period ahead forecasts due to the VAR structure, a measure
of the forecasting performance of the ROVARs for the debt-GDP ratio is given
by the average adjusted R-squared values for the debt-GDP equation. For
the rolling samples is below 97 per cent, which suggests that a parsimonious
specication of the ROVAR model is able to provide both a good in-sample
representation of the data generating process for the debt-GDP ratio and a good
basis for forecasting.13 The accuracy of the forecasts - and hence in principle the
credit rating - will, of course, deteriorate the further ahead the forecast horizon.
Figure 3 shows actual debt-GDP ratios for the EU14 countries from 1995:1
to 2012:4 together with the estimated standard deviations of the 1-period ahead
forecast errors from the ROVAR which we draw on when interpreting the results
in Section 5. Two features are of particular relevance. First, in all countries
volatility is positively related to the level of the debt-GDP ratio for most of
the sample period and, in particular, from the second half of the 2000s. This
co-movement between the level and the volatility of the debt-GDP ratio has
important implications for the measurement of the default probability and the
sovereign credit rating. Uncertainty, measured by the standard deviation of
the ROVAR forecast error, increases over the forecasting horizon. Equation
(4) implies that this has the e¤ect of increasing the default probability, in turn
reducing the credit rating. If the actual debt-GDP ratio has an increasing
(declining) trend, then the ROVAR typically forecasts an increasing (decreas-
ing) debt-GDP ratio and equation (4) a higher probability of default. This is
compounded by the e¤ect of uncertainty over the forecasting horizon.
The second main feature of Figure 3 is that in all countries, except Sweden,
the debt-GDP ratio starts to increase from the second half of the 2000s. For 10
countries the starting date of the increase in the debt-GDP ratio is the year 2007;
for 6 of these it is 2007:2. This common pattern clearly marks the beginning of
deterioration in the EU scal stances 4 quarters before the collapse of Lehman
in September 2008. This deterioration in European scal stances is connected
with the conduct of U.S. and European monetary policy in the late 1990s and
early 2000s, which was characterized by low policy rates in both.14 By 2003:4 the
federal funds rate reached its lowest value (1 per cent) since 1960. It then began
to increase, peaking at about 5.25 per cent by 2007:1. This triggered the burst
in the data for government expenditures and hence they are included in the model through
the decit. Second, to the extent that any shock in the nancial sector is reected on the
term-structure of the interest rates, this is also captured by the VAR through the inclusion
of the short- and long-term rates. These shocks a¤ect the distribution of the forecasts of the
debt-GDP ratio and hence the credit rating.
13For reasons of space we do not report descriptive statistics of the data and the ROVAR
estimates. These are available upon request from the authors.
14Taylor (2010) provides an insightful reection on the conduct and implications of U.S.
monetary policy in the period leading up to the crisis.
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Figure 3: Debt-GDP ratio in EU14 countries, 1995:1-2012:4: actual observation
(solid line) and standard deviation of 1-period ahead forecast error (dotted line)
from ROVAR model.
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of the U.S. housing bubble (between 2005 and 2006) and an increase in rates
of interest across the world. In Europe, the short-term rate reached its lowest
value, about 2 per cent, in 2005 and then increased to peak at about 5 per cent
in 2008:2. The increase in interest rates had a direct negative e¤ect on the public
nances of EU countries by raising the cost of public borrowing. It also had
an indirect negative e¤ect as in several countries it burst a house-price bubble
and led to a fall in output and an increase in unemployment which reduced tax
revenues and increased public expenditures. This interpretation would suggest
that the European sovereign debt crisis was ultimately a negative spillover of
international monetary policy.
4 Debt limits
4.1 Theory
Measuring the value of the debt-GDP ratio above which a government is ex-
pected to default is neither straightforward nor uncontroversial. Market ana-
lysts and investors may have in mind a debt-GDP threshold of their own, which
may depend on subjective considerations about a governments ability and will-
ingness to meet its nancial obligations.
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The empirical literature on debt-GDP ratios at times of default can be em-
ployed to construct rule-of-thumb estimates of the debt limit. Burnsides (2005)
review of this literature points out that "safe" debt-GDP levels for countries that
have experienced a series of defaults are much lower than those of industrialized
countries. They also vary over time. This suggests that a meaningful cross-
country comparison of sovereign credit ratings should be based on a measure of
the debt limit that is state and time dependent.
The theoretical literature on sovereign credit risk initially focused on emerg-
ing markets. It provides a number of explanations for why sovereigns choose to
service their debt rather than default such as the risk of exclusion from the cap-
ital market (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981), incurring economic sanctions (Sachs,
1984), or loosing sovereign reputation (Eaton and Fernandez, 1995). The main
problem with these explanations is that the predicted level of government debt
at which sovereign default is likely to occur is low relative to the debt levels
observed in developed countries (Arellano, 2008). Models of liquidity crises -
for example, Cole and Kehoe (2000) - can be used to derive debt-GDP thresh-
olds. Above these thresholds default is however undetermined as it depends on
whether a country can still avoid a liquidity crisis. Broner, Martin and Ventura
(2010) have recently extended this theoretical literature by considering the role
of secondary markets in determining sovereign default events.
More recently, a new literature on sovereign credit risk in advanced economies
has emerged, see Davig, Leeper and Walker (2010, 2011) and Bi (2011). The
assumption in this approach is that a government will always repay its debt
provided it is able to generate the required nancial savings. Excluded are
considerations of whether or not generating these savings are politically feasi-
ble. This literature focuses on the ability of governments to raise revenue from
unanticipated changes in distortionary taxes that are bounded above due to the
La¤er e¤ect, given the market expectation of future government expenditures.
As a result, a government may be unable to generate enough revenue to nance
its debt, particularly when debt is high. Default therefore occurs endogenously
in the model when the equilibrium level of debt exceeds its feasible upper bound.
This is referred to as the scal limit.
We extend this literature in four ways. First, to compute the La¤er curves
we employ an open-economy rather than a closed-economy model as used by
Trabandt and Uhlig (2011). Second, we consider distortionary taxation on in-
come from labor, capital and consumption rather than labor alone. Third, we
show that the scal limit is a special case of a broader range of debt limits
that can be derived from DSGE macroeconomic models. Fourth, we determine
a time-series of these debt limits in order to evaluate how and why they have
changed over time. For each country, the model of the economy includes four
sectors: households, rms, the government and the rest of the world. The ana-
lytical framework is described by the following equations, now expressed in real
terms:
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yt = ct + gt + kt   (1  ) kt 1 + xt: (13)
Households derive utility from total consumption ct and leisure 1   nt,
and seek to maximize their lifetime utility in equation (7); where E0 denotes
mathematical expectation conditioned on time 0 information,  2 (0; 1) is the
household discount factor, u (:) is a twice continuously di¤erentiable, increasing,
strictly concave utility function and nt denotes the supply of labor. Household
maximization is subject to the budget constraint, equation (8), in which kt; bDt ,
ft, wt, st, rkt , rt, r

t , zt, , 
c
t , 
n
t and 
k
t respectively denote physical capital,
government bonds held by domestic households, real net foreign assets denom-
inated in foreign currency, the real wage, the real exchange rate (dened as
the home currency per unit of foreign currency), the real rate of return from
capital, the domestic real rate of return on bonds, the real rate of return on
foreign assets, government transfers, the rate of physical depreciation, the tax
rates on consumption, labor income and net income from capital, rkt   . We
assume that the data on the market value of rt incorporates any risk due to
default on interest payments or the repayment of principal. These variables are
treated as exogenous as the aim is to derive stationary equilibrium solutions
of the debt limits that account for the default risk, rather than to identify an
endogenous transmission mechanism linking default risk to interest rates as, for
example, in Bi (2011). There is imperfect substitutability between home and
foreign goods. Total consumption is assumed to satisfy the CES function de-
scribed in equation (9); cHt , c
F
t ,  and  denote goods purchased domestically,
goods purchased from abroad, the relative expenditure weight on domestic and
foreign goods, and the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign
goods respectively. Output is generated by the labor-augmenting Cobb-Douglas
production function (10), where At denotes technological progress and  is the
income share of capital. Equation (11) describes the government budget con-
straint, where gt is government expenditure on goods and services, and bFt is
government debt held abroad and denominated in domestic currency. In or-
der to allow the reconciliation of total revenue and tax revenue in the data, zt
is measured as gross transfers net of any source of government revenue other
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than taxation. The balance of payments and the national income identity are
described by equations (12) and (13) respectively, where xt denotes net foreign
trade expressed in domestic currency.
Appendix B shows that under the utility function
u (ct; 1  nt) = log ct +  log (1  nt) (14)
four alternative version of the maximum borrowing capacity (debt limit) of an
economy can be computed from the stationary equilibrium solution of the model.
These are
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Equation (15) is the stationary equilibrium solution for the debt-GDP ratio
under anticipated policy. The existence of an equilibrium solution implies that
the intertemporal GBC is satised and that a government cannot roll over its
liabilities forever (the No-Ponzi game condition). It also implies that govern-
ments can borrow at a rate that allows an equilibrium to exist. The resulting
stationary equilibrium debt-GDP ratio must be equal to the market expectation
of discounted stationary equilibrium future primary surpluses. In this respect
equation (15) is a debt-GDP limit identifying a governments borrowing capacity
based on the markets anticipation of the future evolution of scal and monetary
policy. We will refer to this measure of the debt-GDP limit as IGBCL.
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The other three debt-GDP limits are derived by considering the potential
maximum impact of unanticipated changes in scal policy. These are, by den-
ition, unpredictable. Nonetheless, to the extent that government revenues and
expenditures are bounded (from above and below respectively) market partici-
pants would be able to determine the maximum potential impact of unexpected
changes in scal policy on the stationary equilibrium debt-GDP ratio.
Equation (16) measures the potential e¤ect on the borrowing capacity due to
cutting government expenditure to the minimum. As government expenditure
is bounded from below, it is non-negative. The debt limit in equation (16)
is obtained by imposing the additional constraints in equation (15) that gy =
z
y = 0. This adapts for government policy Aiyagaris (1994) natural debt limit.
We therefore refer to this debt limit as the NDL. Having, in e¤ect, eliminated
government expenditures, the NDL limit precludes a government from being
able to nance higher debt levels from unanticipated reductions in expenditure;
instead it must use unanticipated increases in taxation or changes in monetary
policy.
Equation (17) measures the maximum potential e¤ect on the debt limit of an
increase in tax rates in an economy with distortionary taxation where govern-
ment revenue is bounded from above due to the La¤er e¤ect. This is obtained
by replacing n and k in equation (15) with the tax rates n;max and k;max
that maximize tax revenues from labor and capital respectively. Since there is
no La¤er e¤ect associated with the distortionary taxation of consumption in
conventional real business cycle models, see for example Trabandt and Uhlig
(2011), the tax rate on consumption is kept at its anticipated equilibrium value.
This measure of the debt limit is, in e¤ect, an adaptation to an open economy
(with distortionary taxation on income from labor, capital and consumption)
of the scal limit derived by Davig, Leeper and Walker (2010, 2011) and Bi
(2011). We refer to this debt-GDP limit by FL. It identies the point where
the government no longer has the ability to increase its borrowing capacity by
unanticipated changes in tax policy. Nonetheless, it could still either change its
expenditure policy or use monetary policy, or both, see for example Cochrane
(2011).
Equation (18) measures the maximum stationary equilibrium value of the
debt-GDP ratio, obtained by imposing on equation (15) the conditions applied
to both the NDL and the FL. We refer to this as the maximum debt limit, MDL.
At the MDL, a government can no longer use unanticipated changes in scal
policy to nance additional debt and so would then need to resort to monetary
policy.
This benchmark model excludes the possibility that a government could
inate away its debt obligations. There are two reasons for this. First, the scal-
consolidation strategies to reduce the budget decits in advanced economies
that have been proposed by the IMF explicitly exclude ination (seigniorage
revenue) as a policy instrument, see Cottarelli (2010). Second, in the euro area,
monetary policy has been delegated to the ECB which has set a low ination
target. This leaves little scope for a member government to raise unanticipated
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seigniorage revenues to devalue its nominal liabilities which was a possibility
noted by Cochrane (2011).15
Although, like a tax on consumption, there is no La¤er e¤ect in the above
model for an ination tax, it would be possible to respecify the money de-
mand function in the model to produce a La¤er e¤ect for ination. This can
be achieved by replacing the cash-in-advance constraint by an interest elastic
money demand function. An unanticipated increase in ination would lead to
an increase in the nominal rate of interest and a contraction in the demand for
real money balances thereby producing a La¤er e¤ect. This would result in a
de facto default on non-ination-indexed bonds and would be inconsistent with
the notion of a maximum repayment capacity that is implicit in the debt limit.
Equation (19) gives the stationary equilibrium, country-specic, default-
adjusted rate of return on government bonds. We calibrate this by the spread in
average rates of return on government bonds across countries (see Step 6 in Ap-
pendix C). A time-varying and country-specic risk premium is also (implicitly)
accounted for in the ROVAR forecast of the debt-GDP ratio.
4.2 Numerical evaluation
We derive the stationary equilibrium solution of the four debt-GDP limits using
the nonlinear Monte Carlo Markov Chain algorithm for solving rational expec-
tations models of Judd (1998).16 This is consistent with the nonlinear solution
method of Coleman (1991) that was recently employed by Bi (2011) for com-
puting the FL for a number of advanced countries. The algorithm provides
time-varying and state-dependent distributions of each of the four debt-GDP
limits. These are obtained by calibrating the model using rolling-window means
of the ratio of government expenditures to GDP, the ratio of transfers to GDP,
the shocks to technological progress, the actual and the maximum tax rates.
As the model is used to compare the e¤ects of the scal stance across countries
and over time, we assume that all structural parameters are the same across
countries and over time. The di¤erences between the ratings are therefore due
to di¤erences in scal policy i.e. the mix of distortionary taxes, government
spending and government debt. This is essentially the same logic followed by
Uhlig and Traband in their papers of 2011 and 2012 on the La¤er curve in Eu-
rope and the US. Appendix C describes the algorithm and the values chosen for
the calibrated parameters.
The key variables contributing to changes in the four debt-GDP limits for
the EU14 countries over the period 1995:4-2012:4 are shown in Figure 4. They
15The e¤ects of anticipated ination are implicitly accounted for in the ROVAR forecast of
the debt-GDP ratio.
16 In principle, the model solution can be computed using a standard perturbation approach,
for example, by taking a local approximation based on a Taylor series expansion. Perturba-
tion methods, however, are local approximations reliable only when disturbances represent
small deviations from the steady state. They are not, therefore, suitable for evaluating large
temporary deviations of the debt-GDP ratio from its stationary equilibrium. Furthermore,
the solution of a rational expectations model obtained with perturbation methods can only
be implemented using stationary data which is not a feature of recent macroeconomic data.
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Figure 4: Components of the theory-based debt limits for EU14 countries,
1995:4-2012:4. All variables are as a proportion to GDP.
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are the ratios of government expenditure in goods and services as a proportion
to GDP ( gy , denoted as EXP), the transfers-GDP ratio (
z
y , denoted as TRA),
the actual revenue-GDP ratio (ACTREV) and maximum revenue-GDP ratio
(MAXREV). For nearly all countries the gap between ACTREV and MAXREV
is small. This suggests that there is little scope for raising tax revenues and that
an expansion of borrowing capacity may require expenditure cuts. Given that
tax revenues are usually much more strongly positively correlated with GDP
than expenditures, an increase in GDP may be su¢ cient to achieve this.
Increases in EXP and TRA would reduce IGBCL and FL with no e¤ect on
FL and MDL; an increase in ACTREV would increase IGBCL and NDL, with
no e¤ect on the other two limits; and an increase in MAXREV increases FL and
MDL, with no e¤ect on IGBCL and NDL. The two revenue series ACTREV and
MAXREV are fairly stable over the 1995-2012 period; transfers and expendi-
tures uctuate more. ACTREV for Denmark, Finland and Sweden is on average
about 50 per cent; this is signicantly higher than for the other countries. Gov-
ernment expenditures increase signicantly in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain
and the U.K. until the end of 2009; from about 2010 they begin to fall as a
result of scal consolidation plans undertaken in all ve countries.
The average values of the four debt limits reported in Table 5 show signicant
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Table 5: Average values of the debt limits for EU14 countries 1995:4-2012:4.
IGBCL FL NDL MDL
AUS 1.85 2.35 11.38 11.88
BEL 2.20 2.48 11.06 11.34
DEN 3.36 3.85 12.98 13.47
FIN 3.39 3.72 12.40 12.73
FRA 1.76 2.25 11.65 12.14
GER 2.17 2.89 11.50 12.21
GRE 0.37 0.89 4.05 4.57
IRE 2.38 3.47 7.97 9.05
ITA 1.17 1.50 8.11 8.44
NET 3.17 4.13 12.07 13.03
POR 1.17 2.48 6.34 7.65
SPA 1.26 2.20 7.72 8.66
SWE 2.57 2.98 12.52 12.93
UK 1.28 2.59 8.47 9.78
EU14
Mean 2.01 2.70 9.87 10.56
St. dev. 0.24 0.20 0.17 0.12
di¤erences. NDL and MDL, which are based on zero government expenditures,
are much higher than IGBCL and FL, which are based on expected expenditures
and are therefore more realistic. While NDL and MDL imply overall average
debt limits of 9.87 and 10.56 times GDP, respectively, IGBCL and FL imply
debt limits of 2.01 and 2.70. NDL and MDL also uctuate less due to eliminat-
ing expenditures. The di¤erence between IGBCL and FL shows the e¤ects of
maximizing tax revenues.
Country di¤erences in the debt limits are due to di¤erences in scal policy
- i.e. the mix of distortionary taxes, government spending and government
debt in each country - and to di¤erent country technology shocks, which reect
asymmetries in their business cycles. The highest debt limits are those for the
Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands. They also have the highest tax
revenues as a proportion of GDP. The countries with the lowest debt limits
are Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the UK. These are the countries most
a¤ected by the latest nancial crisis.
Figure 5 shows how the IGBCL and FL and the historic debt-GDP ratios
have evolved over the period 1995:4 to 2012:4 for the EU14 countries. These
data give useful information about their scal stances. The scal stance is sus-
tainable, in the sense that government are not over-borrowing under anticipated
policy, if the debt-GDP ratio lies below the IGBCL as this implies that expected
future scal surpluses are su¢ cient to repay existing debt, see Polito and Wick-
ens (2011). A debt-GDP ratio below FL implies that a government may still be
solvent by implementing revenue-maximizing taxation. The historic debt-GDP
ratio are below the IGBCL and the FL for all EU14 countries except Greece
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Figure 5: IGBCL, FL and debt-GDP ratio in EU14 countries, 1995:4 - 2012:4.
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(throughout the sample period) and Portugal (where its IGBCL lies below its
debt-GDP ratio from 2008). The debt-GDP ratio is almost the same as the
IGBCL for Italy throughout the sample period, and for Spain and the UK from
2008; for France and Ireland they have been converging. This shows the impact
of the nancial crisis on their scal stances. For most countries the two debt
limits do not uctuate greatly. The main exception is the Netherlands where
IGBCL and FL have increased over time. The gap between IGBCL and FL
has also been fairly stable and is quite small for Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Greece, Italy and Sweden. The IGBCL and FL of Greece and
Portugal have fallen steadily over the sample period, while for Ireland they have
fallen since 2008.
The debt limits are estimates and so are random variables. They also have
time-varying distributions. Figures 6 and 7 show how the distributions of IG-
BCL and the FL have changed over the sample period. The dotted line denotes
the average probability density functions (PDF) from 2001 to 2007; the dashed
line is the PDF in 2010 and the solid line is the PDF in 2012.
Except for Sweden and the Netherlands, between 2007 and 2010 the distri-
butions of both debt limits have shifted to the left, showing a lower borrowing
capacity due to increased government expenditures. The PDFs of the IGBCL
for Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal and the UK have
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Figure 6: State-dependent probability density function of the IGBCL of EU14
countries at selected dates.
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shifted to the right since 2010 as a result of scal consolidation; only Irelands
has shifted to the left. The PDFs of FL have all either shifted to the right
or remained the same since 2010. The distributions of both debt limits have
shifted to the left for both Greece and Ireland.
5 Model-based ratings for EU14 countries
5.1 Main ndings
In this section we report the model-based estimates of the credit ratings of the
EU14 countries which are based exclusively on an assessment of the nancial
ability of governments to use their scal instruments to meet their outstanding
debt obligations.17 As previously noted, this measure of the credit ratings has a
17We report a smoothed version of the model-based credit rating determined as follows:
in the rst period of the sample the reported credit rating is set equal to the initial credit
rating; if the new initial credit rating (from the second period onwards) is the same as the
previous quarters initial rating, the new reported rating is set equal to the rating reported
in the previous quarter; if the new initial credit rating is higher (lower) than the previous
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Figure 7: State-dependent probability density function of the FL of EU14 coun-
tries at selected dates.
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5
0
5
10
AUS
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5
0
5
10
BEL
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5
0
5
10
DEN
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5
0
5
10
FIN
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5
0
5
10
FRA
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5
0
5
10
GER
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5
0
5
10
GRE
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5
0
5
10
IRE
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5
0
5
10
ITA
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5
0
5
10
NET
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5
0
5
10
POR
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5
0
5
10
SPA
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5
0
5
10
SWE
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5
0
5
10
UK.
average 2001-2007 2010 2012
di¤erent interpretation from that of the CRAs as their judgements take account
of non-scal factors such as the willingness of a government to repay its debt,
the political feasibility of implementing required scal changes, the possibility of
nancing debt through domestic monetary policy and the likelihood of receiving
international bailouts.
Figure 8 shows the model-based credit ratings for the EU14 countries for
the period 1995:4-2012:4. These are based on debt-GDP forecasts and default
probabilities at the 5-year horizon and three debt limits: IGBCL (dashed line),
FL (solid line) and MDL (dotted line); for reference, the historic sovereign credit
rating is also reported (dashed-dotted line). The model-based credit ratings
therefore di¤er across countries due solely due to a countrys scal stance. They
are also a¤ected by the choice of debt limit. In general, downgrades are more
likely, and last longer, using the IGBCL than the FL limit. MDL, the highest
debt limit, generates an implausible triple-A credit rating for most countries
for most of the sample period. Even using the highest debt limit, however, the
model-based credit rating downgrades Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain from
2007 onwards.
periods initial rating then the reported credit rating is upgraded (downgraded) by one notch.
Polito and Wickens (2012b) explain this in detail and provide examples based on U.S. data.
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Figure 8: Model-based (5-year horizon) and historic credit ratings in EU14
countries, 1995:4-2012:4.
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Di¤erences between the historic and the model-based credit ratings depend
on the country.18 Denmark is the only country with a triple-A credit rating for
the whole sample period. In contrast, the model-based credit ratings for Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Portugal Spain and the U.K. vary considerably depending on the
denition of the debt limit. For the other countries the credit ratings show little
sensitivity to the choice of debt limit, despite minor short-term downgrades from
triple-A, mainly occurring after 2005, and when using the IGBCL.
A clearer idea of the e¤ects on country credit ratings of uncertainty about
the appropriate measure of the debt limit may be obtained by dividing the
di¤erence between the two limits into one percentage point increments. Credit
ratings may then be constructed at each point in the grid to form a distribution
of credit ratings. The median, 16th and 84th percentile values of the rating
distribution obtained using the IGBCL as lower bound and the FL as upper
bound are shown in Figure 9. The letter grades corresponding to the median
18We have also derived the credit ratings based on the other three forecasting horizons
for the computation of the cumulative default probability, as in Table 4. This shows that
downgrades occur more frequently and for prolonged periods the longer is the forecasting
horizon. Using the average default probability yields results similar to the 10-year horizon.
These results, which are not reported in the main text for reasons of space, are available upon
request.
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Figure 9: Model-based (5-year ahead) and historic credit ratings for EU14 coun-
tries, 1995:4 - 2012:4. Debt limit ranges from IGBCL to FL. Dotted lines denote
condence bands.
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values for each country are reported in Table 8 in Appendix D.
Three groups of countries may be identied. In the rst group are Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden.
Their model-based credit ratings are close to their historic rating in being triple-
A for most of the 1995-2012 period. Downgrades from the triple-A rating occur
for short periods and do not exceed 1 or 2 notches. In the second group are
Ireland and the U.K. Their downgrades for the second half of the 2000s antic-
ipate the downgrades observed in the historic ratings. In both countries the
model-based credit ratings begin to improve from about 2011 onwards.19 The
third group consists of Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal, each of which has
a very di¤erent rating prole. For several years they also have historic credit
ratings that are signicantly di¤erent from their model-based ratings. For Por-
tugal the model-based credit rating is higher than the historic rating until 2008
when it falls more sharply than the historic rating before stabilizing at a similar
level. For Italy the historic credit rating has been signicantly higher than the
model-based rating during the second half of the 1990s and from 2008. During
19The recovery of the model measure of the credit rating towards the triple-A mark for
Ireland and the U.K. during 2011-2012 is also driven by the fact that the forecasts of the
debt-GDP ratio in these three countries are quickly mean reverting.
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2008-2012 the model-based rating for Italy has fallen much more sharply than
the historic rating. For Spain, the model-based rating is signicantly lower than
the historic rating until the early 2000s. The two then move together until the
beginning of the second half of the 2000s when the model-based rating starts
to downgrade. For Greece the historic credit rating is much higher than the
model-based rating for the whole period. The C-grade rating throughout re-
ects the nding in Figure 4 that Greeces debt-GDP ratio has been below the
FL debt limit over the same period.20
Table 6 reports sample averages and the number of rate changes for both the
model-based and the historic credit ratings. The average model-based rating is
lower than the historic by more than 2 notches for the whole sample period
for only Greece, Italy and Spain; this happens for Ireland, Portugal and the
U.K. during the period 2008-2012. In addition, for the model-based credit
ratings revisions are twice as frequent as for the historic ratings, though a similar
proportion (about 60 per cent) of revisions occurred over the period 2008-2012.
Whether these di¤erences reect a systematic overstatement of credit ratings
by the CRAs or are the result of including factors additional to those associated
with the scal position is unclear.
A key parameter that might in theory a¤ect these results is the labor supply
elasticity. The higher this elasticity, the less will be the additional tax revenue
obtained by raising the labor tax rate, and hence the lower the debt limit and
the credit rating. Given the choice of utility function - equation (14) - which
assumes a leisure preference parameter  of 0:6, this elasticity is time varying.
To check the robustness of these results we examined the e¤ect of increasing  
by 10 per cent. On average, across the 14 countries, this reduces the maximum
tax revenue at the peak of the La¤er curve by about 2 per cent and reduces
their scal limits (FL) from 2:70 (see Table 5, penultimate row) to 2:26. Other
than for Greece and Italy, however, there is no signicant change in the average
credit ratings for individual EU countries. The average credit rating using this
scal limit is reduced by 5 notches for Greece and 15 notches for Italy, which
is similar to their credit ratings based on IGBCL. In other words, these two
countries then have almost no scope for raising their debt limit by increasing
labor taxes.
5.2 Stylized facts revisited
In Section 2 we identied ve notable features of the o¢ cial credit ratings for
the EU14 countries which we referred to as stylized facts. We revisit these in
the light of our ndings. The cross-country distributions of the model-based
credit ratings of the EU14 countries at selected dates over the period 1995-2012
are reported in Table 7. The table shows that SF1 still holds when using the
model-based credit rating: the share of EU14 countries rated investment grade
20 In a separate exercise we have examined the e¤ects of uncertainty about the debt-GDP
forecasts by recalculating the credit rating using bootstrapped forecasts. This caused a widen-
ing of the condence bands in Figure 9. The results are not reported here for reasons of space,
but are available upon request from the authors.
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Table 6: Model-based and historic sovereign credit rating of EU14 countries,
summary statistics.
Average credit rating
Model Historic
1995-2012 2008-2012 1995-2012 2008-2012
AUS Aaa Aaa Aaa Aaa
BEL Aaa Aaa Aa1 Aa1
DEN Aaa Aaa Aaa Aaa
FIN Aaa Aaa Aaa Aaa
FRA Aaa Aaa Aaa Aaa
GER Aaa Aaa Aaa Aaa
GRE C C Baa1 Ba1
IRE Aa1 Aa2 Aa1 A1
ITA Ba2 Ba3 Aa3 Aa3
NET Aaa Aaa Aaa Aaa
POR Aa3 Baa2 Aa3 A3
SPA A1 Aa2 Aa1 Aa2
SWE Aaa Aaa Aa1 Aaa
UK Aa1 Aa3 Aaa Aaa
Credit rating changes
Model Historic
1995-2012 2008-2012 1995-2012 2008-2012
Total 168 98 40 24
Downgrades 82 61 24 24
Notes: Authorscalculations based on data in Figure 12.
is still higher than for other countries (see Table 2). SF2 no longer holds as
the distribution does not lie entirely within the investment grade. Instead, it
is bimodal during the pre-crisis period. SF3, which is related to changes in
the mix of grades, also appears to hold no longer. Previously we noted that
signicant changes in the distribution of the historic credit ratings of EU14
countries began to occur from 2010 onwards. Using model-based credit ratings
we observe that changes in the distribution begin in 2007-2008, reecting the
fact that the model-based ratings anticipate the 2010-2011 downgrades by the
CRAs of several of the EU14 countries. By 2012 the distribution appears to be
less skewed around the triple-A mark relative to the pre-crisis period. Table 9 in
appendix D shows that these results for SF1-SF3 are not a¤ected by the choice
of debt limit. In addition we noted previously that several countries in the
sample are downgraded from 2008 even under the MDL limit, which suggests
that a shift in the cross-section distribution is observed even under the highest
possible assessment of the borrowing capacity.
SF4, which relates to the variability over time of country credit ratings still
holds: the composition of the four groups of countries has however changed.
This emerges from Figure 9. Under the model-based measure of sovereign credit
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Table 7: Distribution of the model-based sovereign credit rating of EU14 coun-
tries at selected dates based on the median value rating when the debt limit
ranges between FL and IGBCL.
1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Aaa 71% 79% 86% 86% 79% 50% 64% 50% 50% 50%
Aa 7% 7% 0% 0% 14% 36% 7% 21% 21% 14%
A 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 7% 7% 7% 14%
Baa 0% 7% 7% 7% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Ba 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 7% 14% 7% 7% 7%
B 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 7% 0% 7%
Caa-C 21% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 14% 7%
IG 79% 93% 93% 93% 93% 86% 79% 79% 79% 79%
Notes: IG=Investment grade. Source: Authorscalculations.
ratings only Denmark has a triple-A rating for the 1995-2012 period. Austria,
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden have a rating
ranging between triple-A and Aa. Ireland and the U.K. have a rating within the
investment grade category; while Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain are rated
below investment grade at some stage over the period 1995-2012. The standard
deviations within these four groups are 0, 0.26, 1.40, and 3.61,respectively.
SF5, on the relation between sovereign credit rating and the market percep-
tion of sovereign risk, is revisited in Figure 10 which shows the behavior of the
historic and the model-based credit ratings during 2008-2012, together with the
5-year sovereign CDS prices. Several features emerge. First, the model-based
credit ratings appear to display temporary downgrades in anticipation of sub-
sequent temporary increases in CDS prices. This is clearly visible for Belgium
(late 2009 and 2011), Finland (late 2008 and 2010), France (late 2008 and 2010),
Germany (late 2008 and mid 2011), Ireland (mid 2010) and the Netherland (mid
2008). Second, the model-based credit ratings predict persistent downgrades in
anticipation of a prolonged increase in CDS prices. This is clearly the case for
Italy, Portugal and Spain, but not Greece only because the model-based rating
predicts a Greek default well before 2008. There are, however, still instances in
which there is no clear relation between the credit ratings and CDS prices. For
example, Denmark retains a model-based triple-A throughout the 2008-2012
period. Also the model-based ratings for the U.K. appear to be unrelated to
movements in their CDS prices. The U.K. credit rating is downgraded from
early 2008 coinciding with the sharp deterioration in U.K. public nances in the
aftermath of the run on Northern Rock.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a way of assessing the probability of default on
sovereign debt that is based solely on the scal position of a country which we
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Figure 10: Sovereign credit ratings (historic and model-based) and 5-year credit
default swap prices of EU14 countries, 14/12/2007 - 22/03/2013.
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have then represented as a credit rating. It is more narrowly based than the
ratings of the credit rating agencies which also take into account other factors
in the ability of a government to service and repay its debt as well as their
willingness to do so.
The measure is model-based which has two advantages. It provides investors
with a transparent benchmark measure of the sovereign credit ratings as it is
based on a narrow, but clear and specic, denition of the likelihood of default,
namely, the ability of a country to repay its debt using nancial savings gener-
ated by changes in scal policy. Second, by comparing di¤erences between this
model-based measure and the sovereign credit rating issued by the CRAs it is
possible to determine the extent to which factors beyond scal policy may have
contributed to the CRAs ratings.
The measure of credit ratings is obtained from the probability of sovereign
default over a given time horizon. This is determined as the probability that
the forecasted debt-GDP ratio will exceed a debt limit that is calculated from a
calibrated open-economy DSGE model. The problem is therefore not dissimilar
to that of pricing an American option.
The empirical implementation in this paper involves four steps. First, it re-
quires a prediction of the debt-GDP ratio, and a measure of the uncertainty sur-
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rounding this prediction, over a future horizon. We use a reduced-form macro-
economic model with time-varying parameters and time-varying volatility for
these debt-GDP forecasts. Second, the maximum borrowing capacity, or debt
limit, of the government is estimated using a standard open-economy DSGE
macroeconomic model with distortionary taxation. Third, using the estimated
distribution of the forecast of the debt-GDP ratio, we calculate the probability
that, over a given horizon, it will exceed the estimated debt limit. Finally, we
map this probability into a letter-grade credit rating using information on the
observed default history of rated sovereign securities. We refer to this measure
as a model-based credit rating because it involves models both for forecasting
the debt-GDP ratio and for estimating the debt limit.
Each of these stages may, however, be implemented di¤erently if preferred.
For example, governments may prefer to use their own in-house forecasts of
the debt-GDP ratio and its forecast distribution, and the debt limit can be
calculated from their own structural models, or ad hoc limits could be used, as
in Polito and Wickens (2014).
We have derived a measure of credit ratings for fourteen European countries
for the period 1995 to 2012. The main nding is that a number of European
countries are downgraded from 2008 whereas the CRAs start to downgrade them
from 2010. The explanation for the model-based ndings is that, from mid-2007,
there is a signicant deterioration in the scal stances of European countries due
to large increases in expenditures and falls in tax revenues which cause increases
in debt-GDP and decit-GDP ratios. The consequence is increases in debt-
GDP forecasts and falls in the estimated debt limits which increase the default
probabilities and the likelihood of downgrades. This results in the cross-section
distribution of EU credit ratings shifting away from triple-A and becoming more
dispersed. Before 2007 the distribution was highly concentrated about triple-A.
The historic ratings do not show this shift until 2010. This suggests that a
model-based analysis of sovereign credit ratings would have picked up signals of
an impending European debt crisis two years before the CRAs.
An alternative interpretation is that the more positive judgment of the CRAs
in 2008 and 2009 may have been due to taking account of additional factors to
those that determine the scal stance and whether these would permit debt to be
repaid. For countries with an independent domestic central bank, the most likely
additional factor is the ability to repay debt using domestic monetary policy;
for countries that have adopted the Euro the most likely additional factor may
be condence that the ECB would be willing to act as a lender of last resort
and so help an indebted country to avoid leaving the common currency. The
o¢ cial ratings may also reect the use of information on private-sector nances,
such as bank-nanced real estate loans. These may a¤ect the more general
perception of a countrys nancial position and not just that of the government,
and it might also inuence forecasts of future economic activity and hence tax
revenues. Although we do not directly take account of such factors in our
modelling, the general methodology is broad enough to allow such extensions.
A number of other possible extensions of this research are promising. For ex-
ample, the computation of debt limits omits any consideration of the ability and
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willingness of policy makers to implement required scal changes. More appro-
priate debt limits might perhaps be obtained by incorporating political economy
structures into DSGE models. A possibly even more promising renement of
the calculation of the debt limit may be obtained by allowing policy changes to
government expenditures. Like Trabandt and Uhlig (2011), we nd that most
European countries are operating close to the peak of the La¤er hill for taxes.
The IGBCL and the FL already incorporate anticipated changes in government
expenditures. Nonetheless, an e¤ective way to achieve scal consolidation might
be through a discretionary unanticipated reduction in expenditures than by an
increase in taxes. This might require a reformulation of the production function
in the DSGE macroeconomic model, for example, by including both physical
and human capital, with the latter being nanced in full or in part from public
expenditures, see for example Daniel and Gao (2014).
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A Data
A.1 ROVAR
The variables used in the ROVAR are derived as follows. btyt is constructed using
annual series for gross debt-GDP ratio from Polito and Wickens (2011) for the
period 1970-1997; data for Portugal start from 1977. Data from 1998 to 2013
are taken from the OECD Economic Outlook No.92. The decit-GDP ratio is
constructed starting from annual data on total disbursements and total revenue
of the general government as a proportion to GDP from the OECD Economic
Outlook (Datastream, October 2012; mnemonics are XXOCFGU% for expen-
diture and XXOCFYRQ for revenue, with XX denoting the country acronym).
The data range from 1970 to 2012, other than Portugal, for which revenue data
are available from 1977. The missing observation for expenditure and revenue
of Denmark in 1970 is taken from Polito and Wickens (2011). The annual data
for 2013 are taken from the OECD Economic Outlook No.92. Dtyt is calculated
as the di¤erence between revenue and expenditure. Data for t are quarterly
observations on real GDP from the OECD Economic Outlook (Datastream, Oc-
tober 2012; XXOCFGVOD). Observations are available from 1970:1 to 2012:4.
t is computed as 400   lnGDP . t is constructed starting from quarterly
data on the deator from the OECD Economic Outlook (Datastream, October
2012; XXOCFGVOD). Observations are available from 1970:1 to 2012:4. t is
measured as 400 times the logarithm of the deator. rst is derived from quarterly
data on the short-term interest rate from the OECD Economic Outlook (Datas-
tream, October 2012; XXOCFISTR). Data are available until 2012:4; but start
from 1979:2 for Denmark, 1984:1 for Ireland, 1977:1 for Spain, 1982:1 for Sweden
and 1971:1 for Italy. rlt is based on quarterly data on the long-term interest rate
from the OECD Economic Outlook (Datastream, October 2012; XXOCFILTR).
Data are available until 2012:4. Data start from 1992:4 for Greece and 1971:1
for Ireland. The missing initial observations for both rst and r
l
t are derived by
interpolating quarterly the corresponding annual observations from Polito and
Wickens (2011). et is derived starting from annual data on the nominal e¤ective
exchange rate from the OECD Economic Outlook (Datastream, October 2012;
XXOCFEXE). These data range from 1970 to 2012. The annual data for 2013
are taken from the OECD Economic Outlook No.91. The implied depreciation
rate included is computed as 400 times the rst di¤erence of the log of the data.
xt
yt
is derived starting from annual data are available from the OECD Economic
Outlook (Datastream, October 2012; XXOCFC%G). Data are available from
1988 for Denmark and from 1975 for all other countries. Data for Denmark
from 1975 to 1988 are from the World Bank WDI (Datastream, October 2012;
DKWDLTLJR). The annual data for 2013 are taken from the OECD Economic
Outlook No.91. ot refers to the crude oil price, spot Brent, from the OECD Eco-
nomic Outlook (Datastream, October 2012, OCOCBRNTB). This is available
from 1960:1 to 2012:4. Datastream report this as an AR series. We interpret
this as meaning that the data are already annualized. Oil ination is calcu-
lated by multiplying by 100 the rst di¤erence of the log of the data. Quarterly
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values of btyt ,
Dt
yt
, et and xtyt , are determined using linear interpolation on the
corresponding annual data. It is assumed that annual observations correspond
values in the second quarter. Thus the quarterly observations of these variables
range from 1975:2 to 2013:2.
A.2 Government accounts
We have taken from Datastream (October 2012) the following OECD Eco-
nomic Outlook government account data: total government receipts (% GDP,
XXOCFYRQ), Taxes on production and imports (Millions, XXOCFITX), To-
tal direct taxes (Millions, XXOCFTAX), Social security contributions received
(Millions, XXOCFSSC), Gross government interest receipts (Millions, XXOC-
FIRC), Gross government interest paid (Millions, XXOCFIPY), Social secu-
rity contributions paid (Millions, XXOCFSSB), Capital transfer paid (Millions,
XXOCFCTT), Total disbursements (% GDP, XXOCFGU%) and nominal GDP
(Millions, XXOCFGPN).
Data are annual and available for 1977-2012 for Portugal, 1971-2012 for
Denmark and 1970-2012 for all other countries. The missing observation for
Denmark in 1970 is replaced using the 1971-1973 average value. Where re-
quired all data are scaled by nominal GDP. gt=yt is calculated by subtracting
social security, capital transfers and gross interest rates paid by the government
from total disbursements. vt=yt is calculated by adding direct taxes, taxes on
production and social security received by the government. zt=yt is computed
by subtracting non-tax revenue from social security and capital transfers paid
by the government. Non-tax revenue is calculated by subtracting vt=yt and
interest revenue from total revenue.
A.3 Average tax rates
Annual data from 1995 to 2010 on implicit tax rates (ITRs) on capital, labor
and consumption are available from Eurostat (2012). The dataset also provides
data on total tax revenue, and tax revenue from capital, consumption and labor
in each year from 1995 to 2010. A number of observations are missing in some
countries. To retrieve these, we have rst calculated the ratios of each ITR and
the revenue it generates. These ratios are fairly stable over time. The missing
IRTs are then determined by multiplying these ratios (either the average or the
initial or the value in the nal year depending on the missing ITR) by the tax
revenue generated in each year.
We then employ data on tax revenue from the OECD Economic Outlook
described in Appendix A.2 to infer ITRs for 2011 and 2012.
This is done as follows. First, we add revenue from direct taxes, produc-
tion and imports and social security contributions from the OECD Economic
Outlook. Second, we compute the ratio of revenue from consumption labor and
capital in terms of the total tax revenue using the EUROSTAT data. This gives
the shares of consumption, labor and capital revenue as a proportion of the total
tax revenue from 1995 to 2010. Third, we compute the di¤erence between the
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average total tax revenues from EUROSTAT and the OECD Economic Outlook
from 1995 to 2010 (the OECD tax revenue is higher than that from EURO-
STAT in each year). This denes the adjustment required to reconcile the two
tax revenues. Fourth, we multiply the share of consumption, labor and capital
in 2010 by the total tax revenue from the OECD (minus the adjustment) in
2011 and 2012. This gives the value of revenue from consumption, labor and
capital as a proportion to GDP in those years which can be used to retrieve
the corresponding ITRs. Finally, we use linear interpolation on the annual data
to derive quarterly series of the three ITRs. This gives 69 observations, from
1995:4 to 2012:4.
B Stationary equilibrium debt-GDP ratio
The rst-order conditions for the consumption of domestic and foreign goods,
labor, capital, domestic and net foreign assets that are derived from the house-
hold maximization problem are:
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Given (14) and (10), the Euler equations for the intratemporal equilibrium
between labor and consumption, the income identity and the no-arbitrage equi-
librium conditions are:
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:
The stationary equilibrium solution for capital is in the main text, while
those for consumption and labor are c = 
k   g   x and n = 'k, respectively,
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with 
 and ' as dened in the main text. The stationary equilibrium solutions
for output, wages, and net trade are: y = k (An)1 , rk = k 1 (An)1 ,
w = A (1  ) k (An)  and x = r  bF   sf respectively. The stationary
equilibrium solution for gross rates of returns is
r = (1  ) r    =
h
k 1 (An)1    
i  
1  k :
which gives the stationary-equilibrium rate of interest on domestic bonds in
equation (19).
These can be combined to obtain stationary equilibrium values for the capital-
output ratio, ky =
h
 1 1
(1 k) +


i 1
, the output-labor ratio, yn = A
h
 1 1
(1 k) +


i  1 
,
the consumption-output ratio cy = 

1
'k   1

and the real wage, w = (1  )A
h
 1 1
(1 k) +


i  1 
;
with  as dened in the main text. Finally, the stationary equilibrium debt-
GDP ratio is derived from the equilibrium solution to the GBC
b
y
=
1
r

v
y
  g
y
  z
y

;
where vy = 
c c
y + 
nwny + 
k
 
rk    ky + qy , b = bF = bD and r is dened in
equation (19). The tax-GDP ratio can therefore be formulated as
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:
From this we obtain the stationary equilibrium debt-GDP ratio in equation (15).
C Solution algorithm
The Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation involves the following steps. Step
1: Estimate the time-varying volatility of technology shocks. We use the log
transformation of equation (10) to derive a time-series for the logarithm of tech-
nological progress (lnAt = 11  [ln yt    ln kt   (1  ) lnnt]) over the period
1970:1-2012:2. This uses data on total employment, gross xed capital forma-
tion and real GDP. Data on total employment (Datastream, Thousands Persons,
XXOCFEMPO) are quarterly for all countries other than Greece and start be-
fore 1970 (we use data from West Germany prior 1991). Data for Greece, annual
from 1961 to 2012, are interpolated to retrieve the corresponding quarterly se-
ries. Data on Gross Fixed Capital formation (Datastream, Millions Euro, 2005
prices, XXOCFINVD) are quarterly for all countries. Data for Italy are based on
current prices; the constant-price series are determined using the correspond-
ing deator. For Greece, data are available on an annual basis, so quarterly
series is determined through linear interpolation. Real GDP data are described
in Appendix A.1. We assume a capital share of output of 0.3. We then mea-
sure the rolling-window (40 quarters) standard deviation of the derived series
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for lnAt which is used as proxy for the time-varying volatility of technological
progress. We employ data for the period 1995:4 to 2012:4. Step 2: Estimate the
time-varying mean and volatility of gtyt and
zt
yt
. These are derived by calculating
rolling-window (of 40 periods) means and standard deviations for the time se-
ries of government expenditure-GDP and transfers-GDP described in Appendix
A.2. We employ data for the period 1995:4 to 2012:4. Step 3: Estimate Laf-
fer hills. For each country we simulate numerically the stationary equilibrium
solution of the model over the period 1995:4-2012:4 using rolling-window mean
values of gtyt (see step 2) and the tax rates on consumption (see A.3). Each
quarter we allow n and k to range from 0.01 to 0.99 (with increase of 0.01).
We then use grid search to nd the combination of n and k that maximizes
the revenue-GDP ratio in each quarter. This yields the series n;max and k;max
that correspond to the peak of the La¤er hill at each quarter of the sample pe-
riod. The simulation is carried out using =0.95, =0.012,  =0.6, and A = 1.
The exchange rate is normalized, so that st = 1. Step 4: Stochastic simulation
of the shocks. We assume that the natural logarithms of gtyt ,
zt
yt
and At follow an
AR(1) process with time-varying volatility (see steps 1 and 2) and that gtyt and
zt
yt
have time-varying means, (see step 2). The mean of the technological progress
is normalized to 1. Thus we specify lnht =
 
1  h lnht + h lnht 1 + ht ,
where ht  N
 
0; 2h

and h = f gtyt , ztyt , Atg. We simulate these AR(1) process
200 times each quarter over the period 1995:4-2012:4 using a constant mean
reversion coe¢ cient h = 0:553. Step 5: Compute time-varying stationary equi-
librium. Using the tax rates from either Appendix 3 or step 3, we calculate
the steady-state solution of the model and the implied consumption path, for
each of the 200 values of gtyt and At simulated from 4. Step 6: Compute time-
varying debt-GDP limits. Using the simulated values of v
max
t
yt
, vtyt ,
gt
yt
and ztyt
we calculate the debt limits in equations (15)-(18). We employ country-specic
discount rates using the sample average of the long-run interest rate rlt. The
implied annual discount factors are: 0.957 (AUS), 0.956 (BEL), 0.956 (DEN),
0.956 (FIN), 0.957 (FRA), 0.959 (GER), 0.923 (GRE), 0.948 (IRE), 0.948 (ITA),
0.958 (NET), 0.943 (POR), 0.950 (SPA), 0.954 (SWE) and 0.952 (UK). Step 7:
Compute posterior distribution of the debt-GDP limits. We repeat steps 4-6
10000 times to obtain the posterior means and standard deviations of each of
the four debt limits.
D Further results
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Table 8: Model-based sovereign credit rating of EU14 countries, 1995:4-2012:4.
Time Rating Time Rating Time Rating Time Rating Time Rating
AUS GER ITA SPA UK
Q4 1995 Aaa Q4 1995 Aaa Q4 1995 SG Q4 1995 SG Q4 1995 Aaa
Q4 2012 Aa1 Q3 2008 Aa1 Q4 1999 Baa3 Q1 1999 Baa3 Q3 2007 Aa1
BEL Q4 2008 Aaa Q1 2000 Ba1 Q2 1999 Baa2 Q4 2007 Aa2
Q4 1995 Aaa Q4 2010 Aa1 Q2 2000 Baa3 Q3 1999 Baa1 Q1 2008 Aa3
Q4 2004 Aa1 Q1 2011 Aa2 Q4 2000 Baa2 Q4 1999 A3 Q2 2008 Aa2
Q1 2005 Aa2 Q3 2011 Aa1 Q1 2001 Baa3 Q1 2000 A2 Q4 2008 Aa1
Q2 2005 Aa1 Q4 2011 Aaa Q3 2001 Baa2 Q2 2000 A1 Q1 2009 Aaa
Q3 2005 Aaa GRE Q4 2001 Baa3 Q3 2000 Aa3 Q2 2009 Aa1
Q2 2008 Aa1 Q4 1995 C Q2 2002 Baa2 Q4 2000 Aa2 Q3 2009 Aa2
Q3 2008 Aaa IRE Q3 2002 Baa1 Q1 2001 Aa1 Q4 2009 A1
Q4 2008 Aa1 Q4 1995 Aaa Q4 2003 Baa2 Q2 2001 Aaa Q1 2010 Aa3
Q1 2009 Aaa Q3 2007 Aa1 Q3 2004 Baa1 Q3 2007 Aa1 Q2 2010 A1
Q2 2011 Aa1 Q4 2007 Aa2 Q4 2004 A2 Q4 2007 Aaa Q3 2010 Aa3
Q3 2011 Aaa Q1 2008 Aa3 Q1 2005 Baa1 Q2 2008 Aa1 Q4 2010 Aa2
Q4 2011 Aa1 Q2 2008 A1 Q2 2005 Baa3 Q3 2008 Aaa Q1 2011 Aa3
Q1 2012 Aaa Q3 2008 Aa3 Q4 2006 Baa2 Q4 2008 Aa1 Q2 2011 A1
DEN Q4 2008 Aa2 Q1 2007 Baa1 Q2 2009 Aa2 Q3 2011 A2
Q4 1995 Aaa Q1 2009 Aa1 Q2 2007 A1 Q3 2009 Aa1 Q4 2011 Aa2
FIN Q3 2009 Aa2 Q3 2007 Aa2 Q4 2009 Aaa Q1 2012 Aa1
Q4 1995 Aa1 Q4 2009 Aa3 Q4 2007 Aaa Q3 2010 Aa1 Q2 2012 Aa2
Q1 1996 Aaa Q1 2010 A1 Q1 2008 Aa2 Q4 2010 Aa2 Q3 2012 A1
Q3 2008 Aa1 Q2 2010 A2 Q2 2008 Baa1 Q1 2011 Aa3
Q4 2008 Aaa Q3 2010 A1 Q3 2008 Baa2 Q2 2011 A1
Q1 2011 Aa1 Q4 2010 A2 Q4 2008 SG Q3 2011 A2
Q2 2011 Aaa Q1 2011 A1 NET Q4 2011 A3
FRA Q2 2011 Aa3 Q4 1995 Aaa Q1 2012 A2
Q4 1995 Aaa Q3 2011 Aa2 Q3 2008 Aa1 SWE
Q3 1996 Aa1 Q1 2012 Aa1 Q4 2008 Aaa Q4 1995 Aaa
Q4 1996 Aa2 Q3 2012 Aaa POR Q4 2002 Aa1
Q2 1997 Aa1 Q4 1995 Aaa Q1 2003 Aaa
Q4 1997 Aaa Q3 2002 Aa1 Q2 2003 Aa1
Q1 2009 Aa1 Q4 2002 Aa2 Q3 2003 Aaa
Q2 2009 Aaa Q1 2003 Aa1
Q1 2011 Aa1 Q3 2003 Aaa
Q2 2011 Aaa Q3 2008 Aa1
Q3 2012 Aa1 Q4 2008 Aa2
Q4 2012 Aa2 Q1 2009 Aa3
Q2 2009 A1
Q3 2009 Baa3
Q4 2009 SG
Note: SG = Speculative grading. Source: Authorscalculations based on data in Figure 12.
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Table 9: Distribution of the model-based sovereign credit rating of EU14 coun-
tries at selected dates based on the IGBCL and FL limits.
1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Debt limit: IGBCL
Aaa 71% 71% 86% 86% 71% 43% 57% 50% 50% 43%
Aa 7% 7% 0% 0% 14% 36% 14% 14% 14% 21%
A 0% 7% 0% 0% 0% 7% 7% 7% 7% 0%
Baa 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 7% 7% 7% 0%
Ba 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 7% 0% 14%
B 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Caa-C 21% 14% 14% 14% 14% 14% 14% 14% 21% 21%
IG 79% 86% 86% 86% 86% 86% 86% 79% 79% 64%
Debt limit: FL
Aaa 79% 86% 93% 93% 79% 57% 64% 50% 57% 50%
Aa 14% 7% 0% 0% 14% 36% 21% 29% 14% 36%
A 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 7% 14% 14% 0%
Baa 0% 7% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 7% 7%
Ba 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
B 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Caa-C 7% 0% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7%
IG 93% 100% 93% 93% 93% 93% 93% 93% 93% 93%
Notes: IG=Investment grade. Source: Authorscalculations.
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